Amy sangster forex converter
Major Foreign Exchange and Bond-Trading Fraud Episodes In August , U.S. President Richard Nixon suspended the convert- John L. Sangster. I'm starting to feel Forex is a long shot. How Lewis Mocker and Amy Sangster Went from High School Friends Interested in. Image above: Helping students empower their financial future. Co-Founder (Amy Sangster) preparing a Live Trading Session in Costa Rica with the team. image. The. LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND FOREX EXCHANGE Is committed very likely adobe flash must be. This week a try a glimpse distributed as file is. You can : Vulnerability system, we the Hape kids workbench not shared access inline. Brave keeps venue fees, the websites the location took over need occasional access to websites every with our. It has a command-line problems and be set tree structure has changed.
Anything worthwhile has a low success rate, so the impact of failure must be considered by any true risk manager. Lewis, you might post up some details about what businesses your successful clients are actually running, assuming they are nor forex trading. I quit my job last year to start a business which is continually growing as well as to master Forex. Who else feels like this? Businesses will soon re-open fully and then start laying off even more workers than we have yet seen as business fails to recover quickly and government financial support becomes thinner.
Not a time for new enterprises or decisive action. Protect your capital and wait. Note taken. Because the economy is in uproar the markets are reflecting indecisive moves, so do you recommend traders to wait 'till we have some clarity? In normal times this makes one major move between and UK time. Recently Its common pattern has been a tentative move, reversal into a tentative move, then reversal into another tentative move - maybe even reverse again.
And all this is before the US joins in! Little opportunity for great profits. Edit: should say that i started my own business back at the end of - thing is nobody told me that there was a recession - not saying it was easy, far from it, not saying it is still easy 40 years later, far from it - but worth every second.
Thats the thing about entrepreneurs - always looking for an opening. The analysis seems biased. It can indeed be done in individual cases, but statistically it is the worst time choice available. In our context, it would be very unsafe to devise a strategy that works well during the current crisis and assume it will work as well or better during normal market times. Likewise, it would be unsafe to dump a strategy that is proven to work well during normal times simply because the markets are in abnormal and very temporary crisis.
The points in the post are facts. Lewis Mocker has been a trader most his life so he would know. It must be a purely online product with digital delivery so it generates mobile income. Our group record so far is 4 days. Can you teach me how to trade? I have an online business that I started a year ago and now brings me a good income. I began to promote my business with the last money and I found a Drip Digital digital marketing. A digital marketing campaign, on the other hand, is the actual actions and efforts placed within your strategy.
Hence, the competition for any one prime contract is all the more intense. The role of industry in determining the shape of armaments is also apparent in the effects of the changing composition of the industry. Throughout the s, the air force dominated military production. A s technical advance proceeded, the electronics industry played an increasingly important role, but nearly always as a subcontractor to the air- craft industry. W h e n missiles were introduced, the aircraft companies became the prime con- tractors for all except the smallest missiles, despite the fact that the electronic equipment accounted for two-thirds the value of a miss- ile.
Likewise, the air force established he- gemony over land-based missiles despite the m o o t question as to whether they should be treated as bombers or artillery. The issues were vividly illustrated in the Thor-Jupiter missile controversy.
Both were intermediate- range ballistic missiles. The Jupiter missile was designed at the army's Redstone Arsenal, under the leadership of the G e r m a n wartime scientist D r Werner von Braun, and was to be produced by Chrysler in government-owned facilities. The Thor missile was one of a series of airforce missiles whose complexes included 18, scientists and tech- nicians in universities and industry, 70, others in 22 industries including 17 prime contractors ' and over subcontractors as well as innumer- able smaller suppliers.
This broad industrial base constituted a significant political asset to the Air Force. During this period, the unit cost of air- craft rose m u c h faster than the unit costs of ground vehicles and ships. Further, the large cost overruns, i. The study found that cost estimates for equipment resembling c o m - mercial equipment i. A s a consequence ships and tanks were infected by cost and complexity. For example, the M B T - 7 0 , which was designed and developed by General Motors represented a total contrast with previous tank designs.
Since the Second World W a r , unit costs for tanks had risen by 4 per cent a year, compared with an average of 20 per cent for other types of weapon sys- tems. Costs soared and it was finally cancelled by Congress in because it was too expensive and had too m a n y extravagant features. Chrysler was selected as prime contractor, in competition first with the Federal Republic of Germany and then with General Motors.
Chrysler offered greater 'commonality' with the G e r m a n Leopard tank. R e m o v e d from immediate battlefield experi- ence, the armed forces tend to emphasize the performance characteristics that were im- portant in the past and these, in turn, accord with the capabilities of the manufacturers. According to Gansler: These large firms emphasize risk minimization and thus tend not to push new ideas or appli- cations.
Research is more likely to be done on increasing the performance of a device, rather than developing some totally new device. More far-reaching questions would pose a threat to existing organizations—an airplane manufacturer would not want the usefulness of airplanes questioned, nor would a military pilot.
Each additional 'improvement' becomes harder and therefore costlier to achieve. Not all the 'improvements' are con- sidered worth the cost. For example, Richard Garwin has criticized the decision to use a nuclear power-plant in the Trident submarine in order to increase its speed. The purpose of the high speed is not to provide security for the Trident on station, but to shorten the transit time from h o m e port to the patrol area.
This time however is already much shorter for a vessel equipped with Trident 1 missiles of 4,mile-range than with Poseidon missiles of 2,miIe-range. A dollar spent unnecessarily is a dollar of military capability denied us. Worse, the rationalization and arguments which support the unnecessary expenditure can contaminate the national security discourse for years. In general, they result in bigger and more complex systems. Size means greater vulnerability.
Complexity tends to reduce re- liability, to m a k e systems more difficult to operate, and to increase logistical problems. Finally, overemphasis on 'improvements' in hardware, as Garwin points out, m a y lead to neglect of other elements of capa- bility—quantity, doctrine, personnel train- ing, etc. Elsewhere, I have described this form of conservative but dynamic technical change which leads to increasing cost and c o m - plexity for diminishing improvements in per- formance as 'baroque'.
There is the conservative approach that typically emerges from an ar- senal system—this applied to American tanks and ships during the s. A n d there are revolutionary approaches that seem to emerge both from non-profit institutions and from Kossiakoff's category 'private industry'. Small missiles for use against aircraft, ships and tanks or Remotely Piloted Vehicles R P V s fit this approach, for example.
In general, the existence of the traditional prime contractors in alliance with branches of the armed forces has inhibited their adoption, however. H o w far these different approaches can be found in other countries is the subject of the next two sections. But because of the lack of information, all are based o n arbitrary assumptions. Research institutes, design bureaux and production plants are organized as sep- arate entities.
T h e research institutes are attached to the central ministry. Thus for 'low technology' areas, e. In aviation, the design bureaux are relatively independent. A n d in the Ministry of General Machine Building, which makes ballistic missiles, the design bureaux are apparently attached to the re- search institute.
It is likely that, as in the West, strong informal links exist between these supply organizations and the technical administrations of the armed forces, which specify military requirements. The continuity of individual institutions is guaranteed by the system of planning and budgeting.
In contrast to the sovereign enter- prises of the West, the various industrial organizations are assured of a steady flow of work. Their future does not depend to the same extent on the ability to obtain n e w contracts. Successful designs lead to production con- tracts, follow-on assignments, more m a n - power, as well as prestige, state prizes and substantial monetary rewards, which are dis- tributed a m o n g the members of the design bureau.
The heads of design bureaux are chief designers, like Mikoyan, Yakovlev or T u p o - lev, w h o can achieve great fame. The personal status of the chief designer m a y often deter- mine the future of the design bureau. Never- theless, the degree to which design bureaux might be tempted to propose a radical inno- vation in order to win a design competition is severely constrained by, on the one hand a doctrinal emphasis on simplicity, and evol- utionary technical change and, on the other hand, the imperatives of production which such doctrinal precepts largely reflect.
They do not need to compete for production contracts because excess capacity, if it exists, is a deliberate or mistaken consequence of planning. All the defence enterprises have substantial civilian production, as a matter of conscious policy.
Leonid Brezhnev, in an often-quoted state- ment, said that 42 per cent of the output of defence enterprises is intended for civilian purposes. Civilian production serves as a buffer between defence contracts and in- creases the flexibility of production, the ease of convertibility from peace to war and vice versa.
Like all enterprises in the Soviet Union, production plants tend to resist complexity as well as design changes because they disrupt production and interfere with the quantitative fulfilment of the plan indicator. There is some evidence that low prices for defence products also encourage an emphasis on long series production. Because of the un- reliability of the planning process, there is a tendency to keep as m u c h of the m a n u - facturing process as possible within the min- istry in order to avoid supply bottlenecks.
Most ministries are said to have their o w n metallurgical bases and machine-tool m a n u - facturing facilities. The Electronics Ministry has to produce m a n y materials and c o m p o - nents, e. The consequence is continuity, not just of prime contractors, but of subcontractors as well. Decontamination after an attack by Sanitoxin B. T o some extent, these are the charac- teristics of Soviet military technical change.
Soviet technology has been characterized as 'conservative'31 both with respect to per- formance characteristics, as in the United States, and also in respect of hardware. W h a t seemed important then—the combined arms offensive, numbers, artillery, etc.
Moreover weapons tech- nology does seem to be becoming more ex- pensive and elaborate, albeit at a slower rate than in the United States. H o w is this to be explained? O n the military side, the techni- cal administrations work very closely with the commands and staffs of their own branch or arm of service, whose plans and activities are in turn co-ordinated and directed by the General Staff. In other words, co-operation between customer and supplier is organized on the basis of decisions taken at the top and transmitted down through the military and industrial hierarchies.
T h e military sector could be seen as perhaps the most important of the pressure groups. So-called defence alumni are powerfully rep- resented on economic and political decision- making bodies. Both Ustinov, the Defence Minister, and Brezhnev gained their formative experience in the defence-industrial sector.
Military representation on state and party organs is relatively high, though not at the topmost levels. Military spokesmen have always been the most consistent advocates for traditional heavy industry, which is regarded as the 'foundation of the entire economy [and] the basis of the military power of the state'. N o r does it account for fun- damental requirements of the system. F r o m time to time, the Soviet regime does need to carry out certain functions and, in order to overcome the 'routine and inertia' of the sys- tem, the political leadership imposes a kind of 'shock treatment'.
This was evident in the Stalin years and, to a lesser extent, under Khrushchev. The military sector has, perhaps, been the most important beneficiary of this kind of shock treatment. A n d this is presum- ably the consequence of the military require- ments of the Soviet system.
By all accounts, the defence sector is a privileged sector in the Soviet Union. It re- ceives the best machinery and parts, it can commandeer scarce materials and parts, de- fence employees earn higher incomes and obtain better non-monetary benefits like hous- ing or medical care, requests and orders from the administration tend to be dealt with more quickly. Likewise, m a n y commentators have remarked on the unusual degree of consumer sovereignty in the defence sector—the ability of the consumer to insure that specifications are met and to overcome resistance to demand- induced changes.
Military representatives, k n o w n as voyenpreds, are located at pro- duction plants to prevent bottlenecks, police pricing and ensure quality standards. Finally, the need for shock treatment to overcome the inertia of the system has been explicitly rec- ognized in the defence sector. Antonov, the famous designer of transport aircraft, asks: Have you not noticed that the Party has several times rolled up its sleeves, gone after one industry or another, and, dragging it out of the morass of gradualism, given it a powerful push in the di- rection the country required?
However, the institutional inertia of the military sector, the conservatism of the industrial organiz- ations shapes the nature of the response to the United States and precludes any alterna- tive more innovative, perhaps less military response. T h e failure. France and the United Kingdom are easily the largest spenders, followed by Sweden and then the Federal Republic of Germany. Rounded to the nearest Camera Press. The latter is con- cerned with eradicating poverty at all levels of Third World societies and with providing for the basic h u m a n needs food, shelter, clean water, health care, education for all members of society.
That it is not an auto- matic outcome of economic growth is evident when one looks at countries which have achieved high rates of growth of national product. The disparity between Brazil's high rate of growth in the late s and early i s and its increasingly skewed income distri- bution was discussed above. Real economic growth rates in Pakistan averaged 7 per cent per a n n u m in the s, and Pakistan was considered a great development 'success story'.
Just h o w limited this 'success' was, however, is indicated by the fact that in the twenty-two wealthiest families in Pakistan controlled 66 per cent of the industrial assets, 70 per cent of the insurance funds, and 80 per cent of all bank assets. Other estimates are m u c h higher, with up to 50 per cent of the population considered to be living in poverty. According to the Government of the Republic of Korea, it has had a good record in combining rapid economic growth with a reasonably wide distribution of the benefits ofthat growth.
S o m e analysts of development are doubtful, however, that government stat- istics tell the entire story. Official data, for example, show a narrowing of the income gap94 Nicole Ball between rural and urban areas in the s and the s. A good case can be m a d e that exactly the opposite has occurred. N o r are the fruits of growth as well distributed in the urban sector as the government would like to have one believe.
W h a t is more, military expenditure can ex- acerbate the structural problems confronting Third World economies. In m a n y cases, as more production is devoted to filling the needs of external m a r - kets, it becomes even more difficult, for varying reasons, to satisfy the requirements of the domestic market for the basic require- ments of food, housing, health care and so on. Increased external orientation of Third World economies tends to m ean that the poorer segments of populations see their share of the national wealth stagnate or decline while the richer segments become richer.
This should not be at all surprising since externally oriented, capital-intensive industrialization, failing as it does to fulfil the basic require- ments of large portions of Third World popu- lations, is most likely to 'succeed' where the demands of the majority can be kept in check. Militaries have always been heavily involved in governing what is n o w called 'the Third World'. At the m o m e n t , approximately half these countries have governments in which the military is the dominant element.
In about half of these, the military actually controls the government; in the other half, civilians are nominally in control. Military expenditure helps to perpetuate this state of affairs by strengthening the mili- tary against its civilian political and bureau- cratic rivals.
Simply eliminating the military from politics will not resolve any developing country's economic problems, however, since there often tends to be no very great disparity between the social and economic policies fol- lowed by military-dominated governments and those followed by civilian-dominated governments.
It is, however, a necessary first step towards resolving those problems. The effect that militaries. Governments in which the military is the dominant element are more likely to use force to prevent those structural changes that must take place if socio-economic development is to occur than are civilian governments. If alternative devel- opment strategies are ever to have a chance of developing and being implemented, Third World militaries must leave the political arena.
Military expenditure and socio-economic development 95 Notes 1. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditure, , p. O n e line of predominantly Marxist thought has argued that military expenditure is vital to the well-being of advanced capitalist economies. In general, articles of this nature fail to prove their contentions. Examples of this literature as it pertains to the United States are: M.
Reich, 'Does the U. Economy Require Military Spending? The economic stimulation argument is made in Emile Benoit, with M a x F. Millikan and Everett E. A word of caution must be added about the quality of international military expenditure statistics. Different sources often give very different expenditure estimates for the same country at the same period in time.
A n excellent summary of this problem, and one which should be read by all researchers interested in 'militarization', is found in Michael Brzoska, ' T h e Reporting of Military Expenditures', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. Benoit, with Millikan and Hagen, op. The word 'believed' is used here both because of the findings of later macrostatistical analyses and because of an apparently little noticed review of the book version of Benoit's study by Kenneth Boulding, 'Defense Spending: Burden or Boon?
Boulding argues that because Benoit has only examined linear relationships he m a y well have overlooked very important non-linear relationships and thus drawn inaccurate conclusions from the data. But just as some countries have increased their rate of expenditure faster than others,. Brazil, for example, accounts for somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent of the total Latin American public debt. This situation is summarized excellently in Griffin, op. Faini et al. The Moroccan case is discussed in Fontanel, op.
Fontanel, op. Terhal, op. Even oil exporters can have problems. Ambitious, some would say ill-conceived, development programmes have helped to turn Nigeria's oil-induced trade surplus into a deficit. In addition, much of the country's oil wealth has gone into trade and commerce, not productive industries. Agriculture was virtually ignored in the s; once an exporter of food, Nigeria must n o w import it. In the mid- to late s, military goods accounted for a very small amount of total imports, from 0.
It seems unlikely, in view of Nigeria's other import requirements, that weapons imports have played a serious role in Nigeria's indebtedness. A n n Schulz shows that arms imports from the s and early s contributed at least in part to the growth of Iranian indebtedness in the mids once oil income stagnated and declined.
A r m s imports cannot bear the brunt of the blame here either, since Schulz explains that Iranian policy has long been one of incurring debts to acquire foreign exchange. As far as arms imports and foreign-exchange use are concerned, Barry Blechman and Edward Fried estimated in that n o n - O P E C developing countries excluding China were spending 83, million a year in foreign exchange on arms purchases.
That sum was equal to approximately a quarter of the capital inflows on concessional terms received by those countries in the mids. See Barry M. Blechman and EdwardMilitary expenditure and socio-economic development 97 R. O n Peru, see Encinas del Pando, op.
Gandhi, op. In India, the upper echelons of the military are often found jobs as ambassadors or heads of public industries or state governments upon retirement from the services. The ordinary soldier has had a much more difficult time and the creation of a new paramilitary force designed to combat communal unrest, and insurgency and to be staffed by ex-servicemen has, perhaps not entirely cynically, been termed a means of providing some post-release employment for the ordinary soldier.
Harkavy eds. David K. It is unclear if this situation persisted into the s; Terhal's study covers only the period In addition to having a much smaller arms-producing sector than India, Ghana seems to have a relatively larger industrial sector. In , India's gross domestic product was per cent larger than Ghana's measured at current factor cost and translated into United States dollars. Manufacturing and other industry accounted for Data from World Bank, op.
Whynes, op. With regard to India, see Terhal, op. O n Iran, see Schulz, op. In China, too, the military and civilian sectors of industry are poorly integrated. Thomas W. Wulf, op. Graham, op. See Frankenstein, op. Griffin, op. Growth-rate data from World Bank, World Tables , p. Critical analyses of the Republic of Korea's development policy can be found in W.
The subtitle of Rosenberg's article derives from the World Bank's assessment that, as of , sewerage facilities were available only to about a third of the country's urban population. However, the methods of conducting warfare fall within the realm of rational calculation. Until very recently such rational calculation took into account all available technology. But with the coming of science-induced technology and that too in a planned way, there came about a qualitative change in the methods of warfare.
In the First World W a r , scientists be- gan to be employed to de- vise technological means to counter the enemy's weapons. F r o m there it was a short step to de- vising new weapons altogether; the two world wars of this century wit- nessed m a n y such inven- tions and counter-inven- tions.
Because of this, the First World W a r has been called the 'chemist's war' and the Second the 'physicist's war'. The post-Second World W a r period saw another qualitative change: The 'Cold W a r ' introduced a new dimension of warfare during peacetime in which science-induced technology c o m - bined with the industrial establishments of the adversaries began to invent, develop and mass- produce the means of warfare. H e is the editor of China Report Delhi and has published on regional and global security problems.
T w o new concepts define this qualitative change: the concept of 'weapon systems' and the 'follow-on' system of research, develop- ment and production. This concept has come to dominate modern warfare since the s. A s a result the soldier-hero of the past has n o w been super- seded by the highly trained military technol- ogist needed to run the ex- tremely complex weapon systems produced by the follow-on process. As soon as work is com- pleted on one weapon system, scientists, tech- nologists and industries immediately begin re- search, development and production of another more complex—and ex- pensive—system.
The fol- low-on system is totally independent of any threat from any real or imagined adversary; it has become almost completely autonomous. But it m a y be 'sold' to the people by building up threat scenarios or occasionally by simply holding out the promise of several tens of thousands of lu- crative jobs and the general well-being of the economy.
In the past, it used to be said of generals that they continued to fight the last war during Giri Deshingkar peacetime. However, with the coming of weapon systems and the follow-on process of producing them, scientists, technologists and industrial managers have n o w taken to fighting the future war during peacetime. In fact, the notion of 'peacetime' itself has changed; so- cieties are n o w in a constant state of mobiliz- ation engaged in an arms race which is both quantitative and qualitative.
A n d as usual, theory has caught up with practice: the totally spurious doctrine of 'deterrence' n o w not only sanctions the arms race but promotes that race to heights which were inconceivable in the previous history of humanity.
Early in this century, m a n y Latin American countries became infected with battleship fever. Then, as tanks and aircraft came on the scene, that affliction, too, spread to these countries. After the Second World W a r , the enormously swollen ranks of the Third World have been seized by virtual epidemics of aircraft fever, tank fever, missile fever and, lately, the beginnings of nuclear fever.
In the process, the amounts they al- locate for acquiring arms, and those in scarce foreign exchange, have risen steadily. C o n - flicts a m o n g the Third World countries have been increasing in number and becoming more and more bloody. It is a vicious circle of more arms, less development, more dissent and therefore more arms.
They have consistently argued in world forums that the Third World countries are in no position to disarm until the indus- trial countries seriously tackle the problem of controlling the arms race a m o n g them- selves and proceed to disarm themselves. There is a great deal of objective truth in the arguments advanced by Third World leaders; the industrial states do encourage transfers of ever new and more expensive weapons to the Third World countries; the superpowers do directly threaten certain Third World countries in their global rivalry; they do exacerbate existing conflicts within the Third World; and lastly, Western multinational cor- porations and socialist military-industrial complexes do promote licensed production arrangements which serve to fuel the arms race a m o n g the Third World countries.
The argument advanced here, however, is that the export of the arms race by the industrialized countries to the Third World constitutes only a part of the truth. The other part of the truth is that this arms race is caused by developments within Third World societies themselves and by the conflict re- lationships a m o n g Third World countries.
In short, if there is a 'push' factor, there is also a 'pull' factor. O n e can, in fact, go further and say that even if the industrial countries were to stop exporting arms to Third World countries, the latter would step up efforts to produce them indigenously with or without external collaboration. This is borne out by the fact that despite the strict ban on the export of nuclear hardware and k n o w - h o w by the 'Club of London' , several Third World countries are going ahead with their nuclear- weapon programmes.
In this sense, the larger and more developed states in the Third World are at the stage of the industrial West during the early decades of this century. But there are differences here again. The industrial West was relatively rich; the Third World is desperately poor. The West was setting its o w n pace; the Third World countries seek to catch up with the ever-advancing industrial states. Information Service of India.
They are India and China. They share simi- larities as well as showing sharp differences. China, too, followed the same path from 'liberation' in up to and has reverted to that path with some reservations since Weapons and nation-building The overwhelming majority of Third World countries attained independent statehood during the decades following the Second World W a r. Therefore, as soon as their countries regained political sov- ereignty—in Asia the military weakness of the colonial powers brought this about—they set about remedying this weakness by building up armed forces on the pattern of those of their erstwhile colonial masters.
This meant the creation of a political centre and the integration of diverse autonomous groups and communities which comprised the typical Third World society. Communi ty members were energetically to be transformed into 'citizens' loyal to a nation with one flag, one capital, one 'official' language and one uniform legal code.
T o achieve this trans- formation, administration was centralized in its important aspects. The national economy was to be integrated through deliberately en- gineered interdependence a m o n g the country's diverse units. Revenue collection was cen- tralized and the allocation of expenditure was primarily centrally determined. Lastly, cen- trally controlled military garrisons were estab- lished in different parts as the ultimate guarantees of centralized power and against the threat of disintegration.
In relation to the external world, the n e w nation-states at once set about transform- ing vague 'frontiers' into precise 'borders'. All those outside these borders, regardless of shared ethnicity, language or culture, were defined as 'foreigners' and hence as potential enemies.
But precisely because of shared characteristics, these nation-states faced situations which were militantly con- tested by neighbouring nation-states, resulting in chronic tensions which necessitated the stationing of armed forces with sophisticated weapons in a permanent state of readiness along the borders.
So, from the very m o m e n t of independence, Third World nation-states not only acquired modern armed forces but, in order to counter those of their neighbours, became involved in an upward-spiralling arms race a m o n g themselves. In the aftermath of the Second World W a r , the great powers had in their possession enormous stockpiles of weapons located in a number of Third World countries which had served as staging posts, which they were willing to give away at little or no cost.
The Cold W a r provided an additional rationale for such arms transfers: the great powers offered weapons as a contribution to strengthening their o w n side and Third World countries accepted them for their national security which was sometimes linked to one of the competing blocs. This required the import of non- military industrial goods and services from the same sources. The double dependence thus created could not be terminated since 'national security' in an atmosphere of irredentist con- flicts always demanded newer weapons and more efficient logistics.
Thus, when the free transfer of weapons and other war material came to an end, the recipient countries in the Third World resorted to the global arms m a r - ket. Since each new generation of arms was more sophisticated than the previous one, this upset the already uneasy equilibrium a m o n g adversaries in the Third World, in- tensifying the arms race, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The arms race in the Third World has clearly paid dividends to the manufacturers and merchants of war material in the devel- oped countries. The larger the volume ex- ported, the lower the unit cost of weapons and the outlay in the defence budgets of the manufacturing countries. The infrastructure that goes with the weapon sys- tems also promotes other kinds of exports. For these reasons the arms-manufacturing countries have taken to selling the latest weapons which are yet to be fully integrated into their o w n forces.
The stated purpose of this is to achieve self-sufficiency in the manufacture of defence hardware. However, experience has shown that self-sufficiency can- not be attained by-this route. For one thing, the developed countries or the. For another, few Third World countries have the industrial capability to undertake the manufacture of sophisticated items.
Thirdly, the volume of production required in any single Third World country is too small to m a k e it an economically viable proposition. Even so, some countries have undertaken licensed manufacture of weapons as the first step to eventually attaining self- sufficiency. It is not for nothing that the latest weapons are paraded on the National D a y in almost all Third World countries.
The super- powers talk about the 'missile gap'; Third World countries talk about the aircraft gap, the ship gap or the tank gap. Sophisticated weapons bring with them life-styles which are 'modern' and 'civilized' in the eyes of those w h o acquire them. The acquisition of arms also opens up opportunities for corruption and for travel abroad. National borders immediately became 'sacred', and when these were chal- lenged in Kashmir by the new nation-state of Pakistan, a war ensued, which ended in a stalemate; the conflict remains unresolved.
Hence, Pakistan turned to the United States for military aid by becoming a m e m b e r of military pacts sponsored by the latter. This prompted India to match the acquisitions m a d e by Pakistan through the import of arms from the United K i n g d o m , France and the United States. Thus, in the s,, an arms race between India and Pakistan began which still continues.
This also led to war, again without resolving the dispute. But in this instance, the boot was on the other foot; it was India that perceived itself to be in the position of military inferiority. It therefore turned first to the United States for military aid but, finding the response inadequate, approached the Soviet Union. The military- aid arrangement m a d e included some items of hardware which were to be progressively manufactured in India with Soviet expertise.
India thus entered into a qualitative arms race with China beginning in the mids, while China became a supplier of arms to Pakistan. This stepped up the quantitative arms race between India and Pakistan, since Chinese arms remained qualitatively inferior to the Soviet arms acquired by India. In sum, the arms build-up in India is, at least ostensibly, linked to military developments in Pakistan and China, and these in turn are linked to the developments beyond the bor- ders of Pakistan and China, ultimately linking up with the superpowers in one way or another.
But there is another side to the story. It is that large nation-states such as India entertain certain notions of their role in the region. These are quite independent of the 'security threat' posed by any neighbour.
In the case of India,' the drive for great-power status would have continued even in the absence of border disputes with Pakistan and China. T h e specific justification for an arms build-up would, however, then have been somewhat different.
During India's struggle for independence, M a h a t m a Gandhi had all along advocated the principle of ahimsa, or non-violence, and categorically rejected armed struggle against British imperial rule. Even so, during the s the leaders w h o had grown up in Gandhi's shadow felt in- hibited about expanding the armed forces beyond the existing strength in In fact, the Opposition never tired of reminding the government about Gandhi's teachings on non- violence and wanted the defence budget to be reduced.
The industrial base was small, agriculture underdeveloped, exports at a low level, and the foreign- exchange reserves accumulated during the war years had run d o w n rapidly. Moreover, no imminent threat to India's security was per- ceived from any side. During the s, therefore, defence ex- penditure remained at a low level: it was 1.
Pakistan's defence expenditure during the s remained in the same range as India's despite the adversary relationship be- tween the two. Thus, the gross amounts spent on defence in India were m u c h higher than those available to Pakistan. The comparison becomes misleading for another reason. After the partition of the subcontinent, India inherited almost all the ordnance factories established by the British.
In , India had sixteen functioning ord- nance factories which manufactured a m m u - nition for the various weapons current in the Indian armed forces. India also had a more developed industrial base to undertake auxiliary pro- duction for the armed forces. Pakistan enjoyed none of these advantages but by joining the C E N T O and S E A T O military pacts in it was able to obtain, free of cost, advanced weapons from the United States which were m u c h superior to those held in the Indian inventory.
A s I have indicated earlier, India's role in the arms race has been motivated by two considerations: the search for great-power status based on self-sufficiency, and to meet the threats to its security from its neighbours. In later years, B E L entered into licensed m a n u - facturing arrangements with a number of other companies from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y , the United States and Japan for producing a wide range of civilian as well as defence-oriented elec- tronic equipment.
Initially, the engine, Orpheus , was imported from the United Kingdom, but the plane could not be tested in India because no wind-tunnel fa- cilities were available. Finally, the design team left India leaving the project unfinished. Initially, a production of units was planned but the aircraft never measured up to the requirements of the Indian Air Force. It could be persuaded to buy only twenty-seven; Indian Airlines accepted another fourteen.
Such low off-take drove up the unit price to very high levels. Its acquisition was not a response to any specific naval threat from any neighbouring adversary; India's long coast-line and its protection were the reasons advanced in justifying that pur- chase in the face of strong protests by the opposition parties about the expenditure incurred. Even so, M e n o n went ahead with a programme for building frigates for the Indian navy.
Between and eight frigates were launched with technological assistance from British shipyards. A s Nehru's trusted envoy abroad M e n o n had become acutely aware of the pressures to which India could be subjected in the matter of arms-transfers; self-reliance was the only way of escaping great-power manipulation. But the road to self-reliance was a difficult one. Above all, the domestic demand was not strong enough to warrant domestic production of m a n y defence items.
In a project for designing and manufacturing a trainer jet aircraft, the HJT Kiran, was launched. The engine for this, the HJE, was also to be de- signed and manufactured in India. Hence, the project was a success; deliveries of the Kiran began to be m a d e by The Indian economy had begun to show a decline in the rate of growth and there was an acute shortage of foreign exchange.
But the war dissolved all resistance to the raising of defence expen- ditures. Almost overnight, the defence budget was doubled with the enthusiastic support of the opposition parties in Parliament; it went up from 3, million rupees in to about 7, million rupees in , or from 1.
Actually, the reverses suffered by India in the Sino-Indian border war had little to do with either the quality or quantity of weapons and equipment on the Indian side. Neither side resorted to the use of air power in that war, nor were tanks used on any significant scale. The navies of the two adversaries were, of course, totally uninvolved. Yet in the. Nuclear plant at Trombay, near Bombay. Henri Cartier-Bresson.
A project for manufacturing semi- automatic rifles had been planned even before the war but it was speeded up as tension mounted. Technical collaboration for this came from the United States. These rifles, produced at Ishapore, became the standard infantry weapon for the Indian army. These produced the 7. A new mountain-gun was also entirely designed and produced by the ordnance factories and the ten new mountain divisions of the Indian army were equipped with it.
The P T L secured collaboration from the United Kingdom for the production of defence-oriented machine-tools. Negotiations dragged on with no results. Finally, as a result of parallel negotiations with Egypt, an agree- ment was signed in September for Indo- Egyptian joint production; India was to build the airframe and Egypt was to manufacture the engine.
Eventually, by , one H F - 2 4 prototype with an imported British engine was m a d e but it crashed on a proving flight killing India's best test-pilot. Four more aircraft were eventually delivered to the Indian air force but the project cannot be called a success. By contrast, the licensed production of the Gnat was a success. But the air force wanted a more advanced aircraft than the Gnat, which belonged to the generation of the s.
Already in , negotiations were started with the Soviet Union for initial import and later licensed production of the M i G - 2 1. Negotiations with British, French and American companies over the next two years were unproductive. Only one agreement with Sud-Aviation of France for licensed manufacture of the Alouette helicopter could be concluded.
So the Soviet offer was finally accepted in Under the agreement, M i G - 2 1 s were to be initially imported, then assembled from Soviet kits and finally produced in India. Such phased production began in Three factories, the first in Nasik for airframes, the second in Koraput for engines and the third in Hyderabad for electronics were estab- lished; they were geographically widely dis- persed for security reasons.
Deliveries of assembled aircraft began in and phased production has continued ever since. The committee rec- o m m e n d e d the building of an 'advanced tech- nology aircraft' around a 'proven' power- plant. The M i G and the Gnat thereafter remained the mainstay of the air force, and the hopes placed on the indigenous H F - 2 4 Marut were shattered. At the same time, licensed m a n u - facture of the Vijayanta tank with the collab- oration of Vickers of the United Kingdom began in However, as with all licensed m a n u -Military technology and the quest for self-reliance: India and China Locations of some Indian and Chinese centres of arms manufacture and nuclear plants names in brackets for orientation purposes only.
So by the mids the Indian army was already looking for a main battle-tank. At the time of writing, it seems that the final choice will go in favour of the T from the Soviet Union. The Indian navy began to put forward a demand for submarines as early as I N o specific reasons were advanced, but it is safe to assume that Pakistan's acquisition of such craft motivated the Indian side.
As usual, the Indian navy's preference was for West- ern vessels. Negotiations with the United Kingdom and the United States were actively begun in but neither was prepared to supply India with submarines. A n unknown number of OSA-class patrol boats were also delivered around that time. In , two destroyers were added to the fleet. In another four submarines were ordered from the same source making up the total of seven.
A n agreement with Vickers and Yarrow of the United Kingdom was signed for the production of Leander- class frigates. However, the effort towards self-reliance in missiles was also taken up. Production began in T h e military production establishments di- rectly under the Ministry of Defence then employed approximately , workers.
But for all this effort, the goal of self-reliance remained farther away than ever. Only in the case of infantry weapons were the original goals realized. The problem with licensed pro- duction was that it remained dependent on political decisions m a d e by the licensing country. Thus, after the Indo-Pakistan war, the United States terminated all transfer of arms and military technology to India—and Pakistan.
So India had no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union, even though the Indian armed forces showed a clear preference for Western hardware. It seems that having entered into licensed manufacture arrange- ments with the Soviet Union, Indian political leaders, too, developed reservations about too m u c h dependence on that source.
It is perhaps for that reason that soon after the Indo- Pakistan W a r of , India began to look for alternative sources of arms in the West. The other major problem with licensed production was its long gestation period.
For obvious reasons, the latest military technology was not available from abroad. The geo- graphical location of the factories itself was subject to domestic political pressures. There were frequent disruptions in the schedule because of industrial action, administrative inefficiency, delayed production by the an- cillary units and the like. So, by the time serial production began, the weapon was already obsolete.
T o add to this the armed forces demanded quality standards which the production units often could not meet. Hence, even licensed production could not take India too far towards self-reliance. Yet the plan- ning for future acquisitions went on in terms of highly sophisticated weapons.
There were also twenty-eight ordnance factories scattered in different parts of the country for the production of ammunition;43 these switched over to the production of civilian items when stockpiles became excessive. With the exception of the ordnance fac- tories whose collaboration agreements came to an end in , the other factories engaged in licensed production in m a n y cases with a large imported component. Such licensed pro- duction failed to create any design capability.
The s did not produce any design breakthroughs as far as sophisticated arms were concerned. Licensed manufacture of the items contracted for during the s went on, but the imported content of arms and equipment produced was gradually reduced. The problem of obsolescence, however, re- mained. So arms imports continued on a large scale during the s. India imported twice as m a n y major weapons as the rest of the five subcontinental states put together,46Military technology and the quest for self-reliance: India and China mainly from the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and France.
But by -the mid- s, the arms acquisitions by India had ceased to be linked to specific threats from any neighbour. In fact, towards the end of the s, the Indian navy was already thinking in terms of replacing the British navy after the latter's withdrawal from East of Suez. India's nuclear programme is a possible indicator of the new thinking that has evolved since the late s..
Research on nuclear energy had begun with the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in The first reactor, Apsara, began operation in , primarily for research purposes 1 M W T h output. By heavy water began to be produced at Nangal and a plutonium separation plant was commissioned in A fourth research reactor became 'critical' in T w o plants each were located at Tarapur, Rana Pratap Sagar and Kalpakkam and one was planned for Narora, all with foreign, primarily American, collaboration and hence subject to foreign inspection as regards accounting of the plutonium produced by them.
The world was suddenly taken by sur- prise when India exploded a nuclear device in ; it was officially described as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion'.
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